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Abstract - In June 2006, Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision issued a comprehensive document on New 
Capital Adequacy Framework to replace the 1988 Basel 
Accord and to foster a strong emphasis on risk 
management and to encourage ongoing improvements 
in banks’ risk assessment capabilities. This paper 
attempts to explore some significant issues and 
challenges in Basel II implementation for the developing 
economies like Bangladesh. There are many possible 
negative impacts of an unchecked implementation of 
Basel II. The paper also tries to find out what Basel II 
norms should be applied - and to what extent - to ensure 
the survival and growth for the developing economies.  
The norms of Basel II intend to strengthen the banking 
systems globally and this objective should not be lost. 
Developing Economies - like Bangladesh Economy - 
need to be prepared and adapted according to the 
changing global conditions and according to the norms 
for matching the economies with the capabilities of 
developed ones. The impact of implementation of Basel 
II on the banks, the industry and the society should be 
carefully evaluated.    
Keywords:  Basel I, Basel II, Capital Requirements, 
Developing Economies 
 
1. Introduction  
Capital is the fuel and financial information the 
necessary inputs which help to keep the engine of an 
economy in the right track. Banking is a business 
based on the confidence and trust of people enabling 
the mobilization of the funds from the surplus units to 
the deficit units thereby ensuring floatation of the 
company businesses. In this case, Basel Accords 
ensure this confidence and trust by providing some 
important guidelines to the banks with regard to 
fulfilling their minimum capital requirements, 
addressing risks properly, ensuring supervisory 
review, maintaining market discipline and so on. 
In 1988 the ‘Basel Committee on Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices’, for the first 
time, released a capital adequacy framework, now 
known as Basel I. This initiative was set out to 
maintain an internationally accepted framework for 
measuring capital adequacy and ensuring sustenance 
of necessary ratios in terms of the availability of 
assets of various types. This norm was widely 
adopted in over 100 countries including Bangladesh, 
which was implemented by 1990s. Over the years, 
the Basel I framework was found to have several 
limitations such as its simplified approach to credit 
risk, its narrow coverage being confined to only 
credit and market risks, and non-recognition to  other 
credit risk elements. Moreover, the rapid advances in 
risk management, information technology, banking 
markets and products, and banks' internal processes, 
during the last decade, had already outpaced by far 
the simple approach of Basel I. Therefore, a need was 
felt for replacing this Accord with a more risk-
sensitive framework, which could address these 
shortcomings better.  
On June 26, 2004, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) released in the second 
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round the document under the nomenclature 
‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework’, 
which was again supplemented in November 2005 by 
an updating with the Market Risk Amendment. This 
document, popularly known as "Basel II 
Framework", offers a new set of international 
standards for establishing minimum capital 
requirements for the banking organizations. It 
emphasizes on the modern risk management 
techniques and seeks to establish a more risk-
responsive linkage between the banks' operations and 
their capital requirements. It also provides a strong 
incentive to banks for improving their risk 
management systems. 
2. Scope and objectives  
The paper focuses on the most important issues 
and challenges associated with Basel II 
implementation in the developing economies. The 
study has been conducted in accordance with the 
following objectives:  
a) To identify the issues and challenges that 
banks face in implementing the Basel II in a 
developing country as it is the case of 
Bangladesh. 
b) To examine the justification of adopting 
Basel II for the aligning domestic banking 
system with that of the global banking system.  
c) To explore the extent to which the existing    
norms of the Basel II should be applied and 
adapted for the growth of developing economies. 
3. Literature Review  
Several strands of theoretical literature have 
emerged on the topic. A first strand uses the portfolio 
approach of Pyle (1971) and Hart and Jaffee (1974), 
where banks are treated as utility maximizing units. 
In a mean-variance analysis that allows banks’ 
portfolio choice to be compared with and without a 
capital regulation, Koehn and Santomero (1980) 
showed that the introduction of higher leverage ratios 
will lead banks to shift their portfolio to riskier 
assets. As a solution to such a situation, Kim and 
Santomero (1988) suggested that this problem can be 
overcome if the regulators use correct measures of 
risk in the computation of the solvency ratio. 
Subsequently, Rochet (1992) extended the work of 
Koehn and Santomero and found that effectiveness of 
capital regulations depended on whether the banks 
were value-maximizing or utility-maximizing. In the 
former case, capital regulations could not prevent 
risk-taking actions by banks. In the latter case, capital 
regulations could only be effective if the weights 
used in the computations of the ratio are equal to the 
systematic risk of the assets. A further theoretical 
ground argued that banks choose portfolios with 
maximal risk and minimum diversification. 
The second strand of literature on the topic 
utilizes option models. Furlong and Keeley (1989) 
and Keeley (1990) developed several models under 
this framework and showed that higher capital 
requirements reduce the incentives for a value-
maximizing bank to increase asset risk, which is 
opposite to the conclusions of the first generation 
studies discussed above. They criticized the utility 
maximizing framework, which comes to opposite 
conclusions, as inappropriate because it 
mischaracterizes the bank’s investment opportunity 
set by omitting the option value of deposit insurance 
and the possibility of bank failure. However, this 
evidence of the option model was weakened by the 
findings of Gennote and Pyle (1991). They relaxed 
the assumption that banks invest in zero net present 
value assets and found that there are now plausible 
situations in which an increase in capital 
requirements results in an increase of asset risk. 
 Using a dynamic framework (multiple periods), 
as opposed to the static framework used in the studies 
above, Blum (1999) found that capital regulation may 
increase banks’ riskiness due to an inter temporal 
effect. Using a two-period model, he showed that 
banks find it too costly to raise additional equity to 
meet new capital requirements tomorrow or are 
unable to do so, they will increase risk today. He also 
pointed out that this second effect will reinforce the 
well-known risk-shifting incentives due to the 
reduction in profits. Subsequently, Marshal and 
Prescott (2000) showed that capital requirements 
directly reduce the probability of default and 
portfolio risk and suggested that optimal bank capital 
regulations could be made by incorporating state-
contingent penalties based on banks’ performance. At 
the same time, Vlaar (2000) found that capital 
requirements acted as a burden for inefficient banks 
when assets of banks are assumed to be fixed. 
However, such regulations increased the profitability 
of efficient banks. In short, whether imposing harsher 
capital requirements leads banks to increase or 
decrease the risk structure of their asset portfolio is 
still a debated question and, at least for now, it seems, 
there is no simple answer to this question. 
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4. Causes for the Emergence of Basel II 
Basel I (First Accord) adopted in 1988 
suggesting  norms for  capital requirements and  
addressing credit risks has been outmoded owing to 
many reasons, which include, among others,  
simplified approach to credit risk measurement, 
narrower coverage being  confined to only credit and 
market risks, non-recognition to other credit risk 
elements, the increased complicacy  in risk 
management, advent of  information technologies, 
intricacy in banking markets and product diversity, 
and the  banks’ internal processes themselves. Basel 
II (International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards - A Revised 
Framework) is the updated version of the previous 
one and embodies some recommendations for 
revisions of the international standards for measuring 
capital adequacy. It was created to promote greater 
consistency in the way banks and banking regulators 
approach risk management across national borders 
with a primary focus on internationally active banks 
in order for enabling them to be responsive to more 
risk sensitive culture, which is expected to emerge 
throughout the world. 
Basel II uses a ‘three pillars’ concept -- 
minimum capital requirements; supervisory review; 
and market discipline -- to promote greater stability 
in the financial system. 
4.1 Pillar-1(Minimum Capital Requirement) 
The first pillar contributes for the improved risk 
sensitivity measurement in the way that capital 
requirements are calculated based on all the three 
components of the risk that a bank faces such as 
credit risk, operational risk and market risk. In turn, 
each of these components can be calculated in two or 
three ways depending on degree of risk intensity. 
Other risks are also there, but cannot be fully 
quantified in some cases.  The technical terms  used 
to denote  the most sophisticated measures for credit 
risk include EL (Expected Loss) which components 
are PD (Probability of Default), LGD (Loss Given 
Default), and EAD (Exposure at Default). 
Calculation of these components requires advanced 
data collection and developed risk management 
techniques. 
The Basel I accord only dealt with parts of each 
of these pillars. For example, from the key pillar one, 
credit risk was dealt with in a simple manner and 
market risk was an afterthought. Operational risk was 
not dealt with at all in Basel I. An instance of not 
assessing operational risk has been the recent 
pilferage of valuables from safe lockers at a branch of 
commercial bank in Dhaka.  
 4.2 Pillar-2 (Supervisory Review)   
The second pillar deals with the regulatory 
aspects relating to the first pillar, giving regulators 
much improved 'tools' over those available to them 
under Basel I. It also provides a framework for 
dealing with effectively all the other risks that a bank 
faces, such as risks associated with   bank company 
reputation, liquidity, and legal, which are grouped 
together under the title of residual risk. 'Supervisory 
Review Process', is the element, which makes the 
revised framework very comprehensive attempts to 
address the entire risk domain of the banks. It 
requires the banks to develop an Internal Capital 
Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP), which 
should encompass their whole risk universe - by 
addressing all those risks which are either not fully 
captured or not at all captured under the other two 
Pillars, and assign an appropriate amount of capital, 
internally, for all such risks, commensurate with their 
risk profile and control environment. Under the 
Supervisory Review, the supervisors would conduct a 
detailed examination of the ICAAP (Internal Capital 
Adequacy Assessment Process) of the banks, and if 
warranted, could prescribe a higher capital 
requirement, over and above the minimum capital 
ratio envisaged in Pillar 1.  
4.3 Pillar-3 (Market Discipline)  
The Pillar-3 of the framework, Market 
Discipline, focuses on the effective public disclosures 
to be made by the banks, and is a critical complement 
to the other two Pillars. It recognizes the fact that 
apart from the regulators, the markets also monitor 
the banks and that the discipline exerted by the 
markets (information relating to market) can be as 
powerful as the sanctions imposed by the regulator. It 
is premised on the basic principle that the markets 
would be quite responsive to the disclosures made 
and the banks would be duly rewarded or penalized, 
in tune with the nature of disclosures, by the market 
forces which was absent in the Basel I. 
5. Issues and Challenges Associated with   
Implementing Basel II in Bangladesh 
The proposed implementation of the Basel II 
accord for Bangladesh banks with the objective of 
promoting stronger risk management practices 
presents a serious challenge in terms of managerial 
capabilities. The development of such capabilities in 
the local industry requires both intensive training as 
well as behavioral and attitudinal changes. Some of 
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the major issues and challenges that might arise in 
respect of Bangladeshi banking system because of the 
adoption of the Basel II framework are outlined 
below. 
5.1 Pre-Implementation Considerations - 
Timing of Implementation  
Although there is a widespread recognition that 
Basel II is more sophisticated than Basel I, there has 
been considerable debate with regard to the 
appropriate timing of Basel II even among developed 
countries. While most European Union (EU) 
countries have followed a ‘2007 parallel - 2008 live’ 
timeline, the US regulators have deferred 
implementation to a ‘2008 parallel - 2009 live’ 
timeline.  
Premature adoption of Basel II in countries with 
limited capacity could inappropriately divert 
resources from the more urgent priorities, ultimately 
weakening rather than strengthening the supervision. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed, in 
one of its publications, that countries should give 
priority first to strengthening their financial systems 
comprising institutions, markets and infrastructure 
and focus on achieving greater level of compliance 
with the Basel Core Principles. 
With that view in mind, the Bangladesh Bank 
needs to decide whether the timeline that it is 
contemplating in this respect is an appropriate one for 
Basel II implementation. At a minimum, the 
following may be recommended for implementation 
before Bangladesh moves into Basel II: 
1. Implementation of ‘Market Risk Capital’ as 
an addition to Basel I first; 
2. Automation of regulatory return submission 
- developing IT infrastructure for the local 
banks; 
3. Capacity building for Central bank; and  
4. Developing robust External Credit Rating 
Agencies (ECAIs). 
5.2 Selection of approaches 
As Basel II offers a range of approaches, it is 
important to understand the difference between them 
for selecting the right approach so that their initial 
introduction in the Bangladesh market can be made 
possible better. Bangladesh Bank has already 
announced that it intends to implement simpler 
approaches of Basel II (i.e. Standardized for Credit 
Risk, Basic/Standardized for Operational Risk and 
Simplified approach for Market Risk), which is 
probably the right choice. However it is important to 
recognize the limitations of simpler approaches. 
Standardized Credit Risk approach is heavily 
dependent on credit ratings from external rating 
agencies. Simpler approaches of operational and 
market risk does not effectively attempt to quantify 
the risk of the bank - they are more ballpark addition 
to the capital based on Bank's size of operation. 
Implementation of these simpler approaches can only 
generate the true benefit of Basel II if the quantitative 
capital assessment is coupled with qualitative 
measures of containing risk through better risk 
management practices. To ensure this, regulatory 
supervision needs to be strengthened. Wherever 
banks would be found deficient in their risk 
management practices, there is provision in Basel II 
for supervisors to call for an additional capital as a 
part of Pillar 2. This supervisory role needs to be 
executed prudently. 
The advanced approaches have their limitations 
and involve wider range of issues as well, and they 
may be more problematic for Bangladesh. When 
most of the international banks with the state-of-the 
art banking practices are struggling to comply with 
the requirements of advanced approaches, and the 
supervisors even in developed countries are 
struggling with the task of reviewing and approving 
advanced models, the Bangladesh Bank has 
appropriately decided not to venture that route in the 
immediate future.  
5.3 Implementation Consideration - The 
Industry -- External Credit Rating Agencies 
(ECAIs) 
The Standardized Approach for credit risk leans 
heavily on the external credit ratings. While there are 
a few rating agencies operating in Bangladesh, the 
rating penetration in Bangladesh is rather low. It is 
doubtful without a solid base of ECAIs operating in 
country how effective the implementation will be. 
There is also a consideration whether the ratings 
of International Credit Rating Agencies would be 
accepted in capital calculations. International ECAIs 
like Moody’s, S&P, etc usually rate the head-office 
of the multinational corporations. Whether that rating 
would be acceptable for their Bangladesh subsidiaries 
is a point to ponder. Furthermore, there would always 
be a wide gap between the rating of an International 
agency and a local agency. In general, International 
agencies have much stricter rating practices, which, if 
accepted as a norm, would generally result in a 
capital requirement significantly higher than Basel I 
for the Bangladeshi banks. This creates an incentive 
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for some of the bank clients to remain unrated since 
such entities receive a lower risk weight of 100 per 
cent vis-à-vis 150 per cent risk weight for a lower 
rated client. This might specially be the case if the 
unrated client expects a poor rating. 
5.4 Market Readiness  
The disclosure requirements under the Pillar-3 
of Basel II are quite extensive in nature. They are 
probably designed to suit to advanced markets where 
there are numerous analysts to analyze and 
understand the disclosures and take investment 
decisions based on that. It is doubtful whether the 
market of Bangladesh is at all ready to take benefit of 
such extensive disclosures. If not, then requiring 
banks to adhere to such disclosure requirements 
would overburden the banks without any practical 
benefit. 
5.5 Banking vs. Non-Banking Financial 
Institutions (NBFIs) 
Since only banking institutions are subject to 
Basel II requirements, banks may find themselves in 
competitive disadvantage against specialized 
financial institutions, especially, leasing companies, 
microfinance institutions, foreign exchange 
remittance facilitating institutions and mutual funds. 
More specifically, where banks provide services 
similar to these organizations, they may find it 
difficult to compete due to additional capital 
requirement which NBFIs would not have. This may 
create an asymmetry in the industry.  
5.6 Implementation Consideration - For the 
Regulator  
Considering resources adequacy, implementing 
even the simpler approaches of Basel II requires 
significant involvement of the regulators, to ensure 
that the banks are not misusing the new rules. Several 
activities may require considerable involvement of 
the central bank: 
1. Issuing detailed Basel II Guidance, 
including all national discretions carefully 
evaluating their impact on the industry. 
2. Evaluating and continuously monitoring 
approved ECAIs. 
3. Educating banks. 
4. Monitoring and taking decisions on Home-
Host issues for international banks through 
continuous dialogue with supervisors in 
other countries. 
5. Human Resource and IT Infrastructure to 
review and evaluate banks' capital 
calculations.  
6. Supervising banks under Pillar- 2 of Basel 
II. 
7. Deciding Pillar -3 disclosure requirements 
and monitoring practices. 
Without adequate capacity building of the 
central bank to perform all these tasks in a timely 
fashion, Basel II Implementation would definitely be 
hampered.  
5.7 Implementation Consideration - for the 
Banks 
Possible higher capital requirement, under the 
new accord, might, in some cases, lead to an increase 
in the overall regulatory capital requirements for the 
banks, particularly under the simpler approaches if 
adopted in Bangladesh. If the additional capital 
required for the operational risk is not offset by the 
capital relief available for the credit risk. This would, 
of course, depend upon the risk profile of the banks' 
portfolios and also provide an incentive for better risk 
management. But the banks in such cases   would 
need to be prepared to augment their capital through 
strategic capital planning. 
5.8 Increased Competition for Better Rated 
Clients 
The new framework could also intensify the 
competition for the best clients with high credit 
ratings, which attract lower capital charge. This could 
put pressure on the margins of the banks. The banks 
would, therefore, need to streamline and reorient their 
client acquisition and retention strategies. 
5.9 Changes in Banking Practices 
The use-test requirement of Basel II dictates that 
banks must use the capital calculations in their 
management decisions like selection of clients, 
pricing banking products etc. This would require 
changes in banking practices often resulting in over-
dependence on the external ratings of the clients. The 
larger local banks including the nationalized banks 
may have a very difficult time in implementing 
changes. 
5.10 Increased Competition in the Labor 
Market 
Most countries implementing Basel II have 
experienced shortages of skilled people for their 
industries who can understand and implement the 
sophisticated Basel II requirements.  Likewise, banks 
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in Bangladesh are also   likely to face similar 
constraints. A good number of trainings and 
development programs along with seminars and 
symposiums, etc can help overcome this problem. 
5.11 Expensive Software 
Software solutions for Basel II calculations 
available in the international market are quite 
expensive. While international banks can probably 
take advantage of software solutions procured by 
their head office, the local banks may find it 
burdensome financially in procuring and   developing 
such software. 
5.12 Competitive Disadvantage for Smaller 
Banks 
Smaller banks with a concentration on higher 
risk client group may find it to their further 
competitive disadvantage in implementing  Basel II 
as this may require them to maintain relatively higher 
capital level  than the bigger banks do with less risky 
client base. While this is a strong incentive to 
improving bank's risk management practices, some of 
the smaller banks in the Bangladesh industry are 
already finding their operations challenging,  and 
they may be further tailored  as  per  Basel II 
requirements. 
5.13 Implementation Consideration - For 
the Society 
The possible increased capital requirement and 
the significant cost of implementation may ultimately 
result in higher cost of banking services for the 
society. This may be especially true for corporate 
clients with weaker risk profile. Since the capital 
requirement of such clients will be several times 
higher than that of a larger, less risky client, banks 
will be inclined to charge them a significantly higher 
price for loan-type products. 
5.14 Unique Market Practices 
Basel II accord may not be adequate to cover 
some special type of banking practices seen in 
Bangladesh. In Bangladesh market, banks are 
encouraged to provide credit to agrarian industries 
and agricultural farms as well as export oriented 
firms.  
The regulators should be careful that these firms 
don't get at a disadvantageous position due to the new 
accord. If necessary, special "regulatory-segment" 
should be defined to allow preferential risk weights 
to these industries. 
Another unique practice is Islamic Banking. 
While Basel Accord is silent about this important 
banking product, some regulators (e.g. the Malaysian 
Regulator-BNM) have already defined Basel II rules 
for Islamic Banking. The Bangladesh Bank can 
follow this precedence. 
6. Conclusion 
It is obviously important for any economy to 
keep attuned with the pace of development processes 
of the developed countries where banking sector can 
play an important role in the process. The contexts in 
which the developed economies have to set out the 
new accord of Basel II in their economies, a similar 
context must be considered for the economy of 
Bangladesh, what requires a certain development in 
order to reap up the full benefit from the 
implementation of Basel II. By the time the Basel I is 
being implemented, steps should be taken extensively 
to make Bangladesh people concerned familiar with 
Basel II, to develop the economy in a suitable way 
for its implementation. The slow implementation 
policy in respect of Basel II would give a leeway to 
Bangladesh industries concerned to grow further to 
accommodate the Accord. Especially it should be 
given a top priority to the development of local 
ECAIs (External Credit Rating Agencies) before 
abruptly adopting the Standardized approach of 
Credit Risk - which is fully dependent on external 
rating. At the time of the implementation of Basel 
Accord II, the impact on the banks, the industry and 
the society should be carefully evaluated. The 
financial policy makers should be more careful about 
Bangladesh economic standards and about the 
competency of the national financial institutions 
while implementing Basel Accord II. Developing 
economies like Bangladesh’s one need to be prepared 
and to be adapted to the changing global conditions 
and to the norms of the Basel II for Bangladesh own 
advantage.  
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